Hands-on MCP security, one problem at a time
September 21, 2026 · Granthinge
Enterprise buyers increasingly want the identity provider, not the end user, to decide which agent may reach your MCP server. Here is how IdP-brokered access works, what the draft grant does, and what to build now.
Read moreSeptember 18, 2026 · Granthinge
Authorization is only half of what a reviewer asks about. The other half is where the server runs: its network boundary, what it is allowed to call outbound, how it holds secrets, and how a customer's data stays inside the region they were promised.
Read moreSeptember 17, 2026 · Granthinge
Reviewers now ask what code runs inside your MCP server and who wrote it: SDK pinning as a spec decision, SBOM and provenance, an inventory for servers you did not write, and a vulnerability intake path.
Read moreSeptember 16, 2026 · Granthinge
Tools get the security attention. Resources, resource templates, subscriptions, and prompts are served by the same server and are usually authorized far less carefully. Here is how to close that gap.
Read moreSeptember 15, 2026 · Granthinge
A working method for threat modeling an MCP server: draw the five trust boundaries, enumerate abuse cases per boundary, and turn the result into the diagram and control matrix a reviewer will accept.
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