Hands-on MCP security, one problem at a time
September 14, 2026 · Granthinge
A tool description is executable text that reaches the model. If it can change silently between two sessions, your customer has no way to know what their agent was told. Here is how to version, publish, and evidence tool changes.
Read moreSeptember 14, 2026 · Granthinge
Agents retry, loop, and fan out. Here is how to put per-user quotas, per-tool limits, and backpressure on an MCP server, and what to tell a reviewer who asks about availability and cost.
Read moreSeptember 14, 2026 · Granthinge
Scheduled and background agents call MCP servers with no user in the loop. Here is how to authorize them without a shared service account, and how to keep the audit trail answerable.
Read moreSeptember 11, 2026 · Granthinge
A task ID is not a credential. How to authorize long-running MCP tool calls: binding the task to the principal, tokens that expire mid-run, revocation reaching in-flight work, cancellation, and the audit events a reviewer expects.
Read moreSeptember 10, 2026 · Granthinge
Scopes say what a token may ask for. They do not say which employee should have had it. How to get group and entitlement data out of a customer IdP and into an MCP server’s decisions.
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